I study a simple model of moral hazard with soft information. The risk-averse agent takes an action and she alone observes the stochastic outcome; hence the principal faces a problem of ex post adverse selection. With limited instruments, the principal cannot solve these two problems independently. To accommodate ex post information revelation, he must distort the transfer schedule, as compared to the standard moral hazard problem. Then effort is implemented for a smaller set of parameters than in the standard problem. These results are robust and suggest high-power contracts may have to be revisited when information is soft.
Introduction
In standard moral hazard problems the outcome of the agent's action is observable by the principal and may therefore (imperfectly) substitute itself for the non-observability of said action. Then a complete contract may be conditioned on the outcome. This is a convenient model and is useful to study the cost of moral hazard; but it does not necessarily fit many relevant situations. Performance may be difficult to observe, or its observation may be considerably delayed. Sometimes it is not observed at all: for example, an accounting report is not a direct observation of the state of an enterprise, but a message. In this paper, attention is paid to the case where neither the action, nor the outcome are observable by the principal. The information is therefore said to be soft, in that it is subject to manipulation on the part of the agent. Applications of this model are broad-ranging. For example, after hiring the CEO, a board often asks of him (her) to report his (her) results while on the job. A defense contractor may be asked to reveal its production cost after investing in an uncertain technology. In the optimal taxation problem, the agent may undertake some investment (education) to enhance her productivity, and then be asked to reveal the latter to the tax authority. Information manipulation exists in practice: Kedia and Philippon (2006) develop and test a model of earnings management (a euphemism for fraudulent accounting). They document how pervasive the practice is.
Bar for the role of soft information, the model mirrors that of a standard moral hazard framework. A risk-neutral principal delegates production to a risk-averse agent. The agent's action a governs the distribution of a stochastic outcome drawn from a discrete space, which she alone observes. In this construct, the principal is exposed to ex ante moral hazard and also faces a problem of adverse selection ex post. That information must therefore be elicited; that is, it must satisfy some ex post incentive constraints.
1 Because the principal otherwise observes nothing, the contract must include an audit and some (exogenously-given) penalty.
The model is not reliant on endogenous penalties or rewards; that is, the principal possesses 1 Throughout I will refer to "incentive constraints" as those addressing the adverse selection problem and "moral hazard" constraint as that dealing with the hidden action problem.
fewer instruments than in Kanodia (1985) or Mookherjee and Png (1989) . This paucity of instruments induces a fundamental tension between ex ante effort provision, which requires a state-contingent compensation, and ex post information revelation, which is best addressed with a constant transfer.
This simple model delivers some important insights. First, absent some measure of type separation, the principal can only offer a trivial contract, in which the agent exerts no effort. Indeed, failing to separate is observationally equivalent to producing the same output.
Therefore, in this model, at least some information must be revealed for the principal to be willing to implement the high action. Second, any information revelation requires the agent's compensation to be distorted as compared to the standard moral hazard model. This is necessary to simultaneously satisfy any of the ex post incentive constraints and the moral hazard constraint. The fundamental driving force behind these two observations is the conflict between ex post incentives for information revelation and ex ante effort incentives. The one implication of these two observations is that effort is more costly to the principal, and will therefore be implemented for a smaller set of parameters than in the standard problem. Incidentally, these distortions leave the agent's participation constraint slack (absent a participation fee) and thus generate an ex ante rent.
2
Ignoring the trivial outcome of no effort, the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game is unique and induces truthful revelation. The compensation schedule is flatter than in the standard model. A steep transfer scheme is usually good to induce effort, but here it also generates incentives to misreport ex post. The distortions accommodate this new problem.
The optimal contract is low(er)-powered, which suggests that high-power schemes such as options may be ill-suited when the information on which they are conditioned is soft. Reallife stories like the bankruptcy of Enron, for example, abound in support of this remark.
A better audit technology mitigates the need for distortions but even if it is perfect, it never removes them. The reason is this. The standard second-best contract has a binding participation constraint, for which the agent must be presented with negative ex post utility in the worse state(s). Here, even with a perfect ex post audit, the agent can always do better than accepting such a bad outcome by simply misreporting and facing a lottery over zero and some positive payoff. So adding this communication stage after the realisation of the state dramatically alters the nature of the contract.
3
The work closest to this is Mookherjee and Png (1989) , who combine a Grossman-Hart (1983) model with an ex post revelation mechanism. The agent's message conditions a payment to the principal and the probability of audit; that audit is perfect and fines or rewards (for truthful revelation) may be used. Only the latter are offered in equilibrium and they may be arbitrarily large, which may turn the principal into a source of money.
4
With these, truthful revelation obtains and has no bearing on the moral hazard problem because the principal has enough instruments to separate the ex post problem (information revelation) from the ex ante one (moral hazard). The balance of the paper is organised as follows. After introducing the model I present the problem of information revelation. Section 4 then analyses the optimal contract and Section 5 presents a discussion. I conclude in Section 6. Inducing effort requires t 3 ≥ t 2 ≥ t 1 with at least one strict inequality. Therefore it is immediate that absent any other instruments, the agent pools her messages to θ 3 regardless of the state (the principal entirely lacks ex post observability). A necessary element of any non-trivial contract is to restore at least some ex post observability, which I do by introducing an ex post audit. It is exogenously given in this model, costless (and therefore always run), but imperfect. 5 With some probability p(m − θ), the agent's deception is uncovered and she receives zero. Any penalty that is not too large may work; so conditional on accepting the premise that the penalty must be bounded, choosing zero is immaterial (see the Discusion).
Model

6
The function p(·) maps into [0, 1]; it is taken to be symmetric and such that p(0) = 0. 7 It is easy to show that p(·) must be increasing to be useful, which I therefore impose. I also let p(2x) ≥ 2p(x). With this, the agent has ex post expected utility
which she seeks to maximise by choice of the message m ∈ Θ. The timing is almost standard:
consisting of a transfer, a message space and an (exogenous) audit probability;
2. The agent accepts or rejects the contract. If accepting, she also chooses an action a;
3. Action a generates an outcome θ ∈ Θ observed only by the agent;
4. The agent report a message m ∈ Θ;
5. Audit occurs;
6. Transfers are implemented and payoffs are realised.
The solution of this problem in a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game just described. 5 In a separate paper I allow the audit function p(·) to be endogenous. Then it interacts with other variables of the contract. 6 A very large penalty would yield truthful revelation at no cost, as in Mookherjee and Png (1989) . 7 This capture the idea that the audit is a sampling process, as real financial audits are.
After she has taken some action a (now sunk), the agent maximises U by choice of a message m. A mechanism is truthful if and only is the following constraints are satisfied:-
These constraints do not yield the standard implementability condition, as can be verified by adding them up pairwise. This existence result remains silent as to optimality and does not imply that transfers satisfying (3.1)-(3.6) solve the principal's problem. Truthful revelation needs not be optimal, in particular because it necessarily generates an ex ante rent for the agent. Indeed, t 3 > 0 is required to induce participation with any effort but by (3.2), t 1 > 0 as well (and so t 2 > 0 too). However from Holmström (1979) we know that some t i must be negative for the participation constraint to bind. Here the principal's choice of offering a contract such that truthful revelation obtains induces a lower bound on the transfers, akin to a limited liability constraint-hence the rent.
The optimal contract
There always exists a trivial contract, in which the low action is sought from the agent.
When a = a, the principal needs only set t i = 0 ∀i (which elicits truth-telling ex post). I am interested in equilibria where effort is implemented. Two cases of interest arise. In the first one, truthful revelation is elicited ex post, which may come at a cost to the principal. In the second case, the principal may not seek to satisfy the ex post incentive constraint because it is too costly. Let ϕ ≡ v −1 (·) denote the inverse function of the agent's utility, and
for some t i . The goal of the next two subsections is to compute the cost of either contract, which is the outcome of the Nash equilibrium of each subgame.
Truth-telling equilibrium
A truth-telling equilibrium is one where all the ex post incentive constraints (3.1)-(3.3) are satisfied. The principal seeks to solve
s.t. (3.1)-(3.3) and
The last two inequalities are the usual moral hazard and participation constraints. Following Lemma 1, only (3.1) and (3.3) may bind, so attach multipliers γ 1 , γ 2 to these constraints and λ and µ to each of (4.1) and (4.2), respectively. Lemma 1 also tells us that µ = 0 for constraints (3.1)-(3.3) to be satisfied. The next two lemmata inform us more precisely as to how these constraints conflict with the moral hazard problem. 
With this in hand, 
Proposition 1 The lowest-cost truth-telling equilibrium in which the agent is induced to exert effort entails
The MLRP ensures these conditions are not vacuous; the next claim follows immediately. This result owes to the fundamental tension between ex post incentive compatibility, best satisfied with constant transfers, and ex ante effort incentives, best addressed with a compensation conditioned on performance. The distortions tilt the schedule and are such that (3.1) and (3.3) are just binding. The contract is low(er)-powered to accommodate ex post information manipulation. This is shown in Figure 1 . Finally,
Proposition 2 The schedule is flatter (than under the standard moral hazard problem
θ 1 θ 3 v(t s 3 ) Θ v(t s 2 ) θ 2 v(t 1 ) v(t i ) v(t 2 ) v(t
Corollary 1 The principal induces costly effort if and only if
the agent receives an ex ante rent
the proof of which is obvious and therefore omitted. Consequently the high action is implemented for a narrower set of parameters than under the standard moral hazard problem, which is costly to the principal. The rent is is excess of the standard risk-premium the principal must pay (to partially insure the agent).
No truthful revelation
Because combining ex ante effort incentives and ex post truthful revelation is costly, the principal may choose an alternative: truthful revelation may purposefully not be sought, Figure 2 : Arbitrary example of (3.3) failing, θ 2 pools with θ 3 (red dot).
which may make him better off. In this equilibrium, transfers are such that at least one of the ex post incentive constraints is violated, as in Figure 2 .
Even when the agent sends a message that is not truthful, the principal does not update his beliefs as to the true state of the world because he has committed to the contract.
8 I argue next that it then follows that at least some of the incentive constraints (3.1) to (3.3) must hold. If all constraints were to fail, the agent could only report θ 3 , whereupon the principal would pay t 3 . But then there would be no incentive for the agent to exert any effort, so the principal would offer only t i = 0. Therefore, some measure of type separation is a necessary condition for the principal to want to induce action a. One must also note that since some incentive constraint will fail (by design), (3.2) 
s.t. (3.1)-(3.3) and
where ρ i denotes the probability of receiving a report θ i when the agent pools states (since some incentive constraint fails). The exact definition of ρ i depends on the choice of pooling, that is, on which of the incentive constraints fail(s). At face value there are many combinations to consider; fortunately the next two lemmata reduce the set of cases to investigate.
Lemma 4 The principal does not offer a contract in which the agent exerts effort such that (3.2) and (3.3) are violated.
In this case the agent pools her message at θ 3 and no separation obtains. It is also true that Thus the only viable case when the principal's contract is such that it does not induce the agent to truthfully reveal her information ex post requires (3.1) to be violated. And here too the participation constraint must be left slack in order to satisfy the moral hazard constraint.
Lemma 6 There is no equilibrium such that the moral hazard constraint (4.6) is satisfied, the participation constraint (4.7) binds, and only (3.1) is violated
Therefore Lemma 1 and Lemma 6 together imply that in any equilibrium the agent receives an ex ante rent. With only one case to study and a slack constraint (4.7), Problem 2 becomes Problem 3
s.t. (3.2),(3.3) and
where (4.9) is the relevant form of the participation constraint (4.7). Attach multipliers γ 2 , γ 3 to (3.3), (3.2), and the usual λ to (4.8).
Proposition 3 The least-cost non-truthful equilibrium in which the agent is induced to exert effort entails
determined by a binding moral hazard constraint (4.8) and a binding incentive con-
Here v 1 is set to 0 without loss of generality; anything negative fails (3.1) and (3.2) as well but is irrelevant thanks to the agent's deviation option to misreport, while a positive utility level may (at least weakly) dilute the effort incentives. Because of the distortions the high action is implemented for a smaller set of parameters than in the standard case. To complement Proposition 3 observe that the agent receives an ex ante rent
The first-order conditions of Problem 3 read:-
and directly lead to 
Subgame perfect equilibrium
Collecting the results of the analysis of the two preceding sections it immediately follows that:
Proposition 4
If he wants to induce the high action, the principal prefers to offer a truthtelling contract, i.e.
This result is quite intuitive. The only non-truthful equilibrium is one where Constraint (3.1) fails and the θ 1 agent pools at θ 2 . This increases the expected cost of the high action compared to the truthful equilibrium, without any effect on the effort level (and therefore on the distribution π i ). This latter features owes to the binary nature of the action and so may be an artefact of this simple model. I offer a more comprehensive discussion in Section 5.
Altering any of the technology ψ or information structure π(.|a) produces the same effects as in the standard moral hazard model. Of more interest are comparative statics with respect to the audit technology.
Corollary 3
1.
Improving the audit technology tilts back the compensation schedule toward a steeper slope: the agent's utility in the good state increases. But it also eases the incentive constraints (3.1)-(3.3). The net effect is a decrease the agent's expected rent. There is a limit to this however.
In this model even a perfect audit technology does not enable the principal to implement the standard moral hazard schedule. Consider (3.1) and (3.3) and suppose p(∆θ) = 1.
Then truthful revelation still requires v 1 ≥ 0 and v 2 ≥ 0, and since v 3 > 0, the participation constraint still fails to bind. 9 The reason for this seemingly counterintuitive result is that the zero-penalty acts like an implicit limited liability constraint. That is, no utility level v i < 0 will ever be implemented in this model because the agent can always report anything else and 9 In the standard model one must have at least v 1 < 0 to have a binding participation constraint.
face the lottery {p, 1 − p(∆θ)} over 0 and v i+1 , which has a strictly positive expected value.
Thus the principal's reliance on a message from the agent alters the game dramatically.
Last, it is immediate that sign dp/d∆θ = sign d∆θ so that Corollary 3 extends to the type space. Increasing the distance between types (and therefore between messages) renders misreporting more hazardous here.
Discussion
Other penalties
This paper purposefully departs from optimal penalties because they allow for the separation of the ex ante and ex post problems (as in Mookherjee and Png (1989) ). Suppose however that some other bounded penalty −l < 0 could be imposed on the agent, then the constraints (3.1)-(3.3) would be modified as follows:
These are easier to satisfy than the current constraints but as long as l is not too large, the problem remains in essence the same.
It can also be verified that the Maximum Punishment Principle ( Baron and Besanko (1984) ) holds in this model because the audit does not return false negatives. Therefore nothing is gained (there are strict losses) from conditioning the penalty on the offence.
Participation fees
To avoid leaving any rent to the agent the principal could consider imposing an ex ante participation fee φ, so that µ > 0. Then a contract includes a tariff (φ, t). But because φ is sunk, the incentive constraints (3.1)-(3.6) remain essentially the same (up to the levels of v i ). So although the rent may be extracted from the agent, the transfers t i still have to be distorted to satisfy information revelation. Thus effort is still induced for a smaller set of parameters and welfare losses ensue.
Relation to M -implementability (Green and Laffont (1986))
These authors study the implementability of a social choice function when the agent may report a message from a set M (θ) ⊂ Θ, where M (·) is exogenous and publicly known. There is scope for misreporting in that the mapping m(·) is a correspondence. This clearly does not apply in the truthful equilibrium of this model, but it may in the alternative (which remains a Nash equilibrium of the game). Green and Laffont (1986) provide a necessary and sufficient condition -called the nested range condition (NRC) -for the agent to report her information truthfully.
The NRC does not hold in this model, although it corresponds to a game of of "unidirectional distortions with an ordered space" (to use their words) -example a(2) in Green and
In contrast, Constraints (3.2), (3.3) holding and (3.1) failing imply M (
. This violates the definition of the NRC. Notice further that the sets M (θ i ) in this paper are endogenous, unlike in Green and Laffont (1986).
Separation versus truth-telling
That truthful revelation obtains in equilibrium likely owes to the combination of a binary action space with a discrete type space, which renders p(m − θ) "large" for any deviation (so misreporting has a high expected cost). In fact truthful revelation is a nice by-product but it is not essential. Indeed, in a separate paper with continuous actions and types, I show that truth-telling can never be elicited. This is because continuous spaces allow for arbitrarily small misreporting, and a small deviation may be optimal for some types. What is important for the provision of effort incentive is not truthful revelation, but type separation. In the extreme, if all types face incentives such that they all report the same message the agent has no incentive to expend any effort. That is, pooling stifles effort. So, that is not misreporting per se that deters ex ante incentives, but pooling. As we saw in Section 4, providing the agent with effort incentives may come at different costs when she is truthful and not.
Monitoring
Should the principal audit the agent's report of an outcome (θ), or should he somehow gather information about the action (a) -that is, monitor the agent? In the latter case, the agent is paid according to her action, not the outcome. Then the information revelation problem is moot and the risk-neutral principal bears all the risk. Implicitly in this paper it is presumed that monitoring is either too costly or outright impossible.
Conclusion
When the principal to a contract fraught with moral hazard also fails to observe any of the outcomes, he faces adverse selection ex post. With limited instruments, eliciting this private information requires a distortion of the compensation structure; it induces a flatter transfer scheme. This is a low(er)-power contract than in the standard moral hazard problem. This distortion has a bearing on the ex ante effort incentives. It is socially costly in that the high action can be implemented for a strictly smaller set of parameters than in the standard case. These results obtain because of the fundamental tension between effort provision and information revelation, which require different instruments. In this model, inducing any information revelation ex post generates an ex ante rent to the agent (but this is not an essential feature). For practitioners these results suggest that high-power contracts may not be adequate when the information they depend on can be manipulated.
Truthful revelation obtains in the unique (subgame perfect) equilibrium of this game, as it does in the Mookherjee and Png (1989), however for very different reason and with different consequences. In particular, ex post information revelation has no bearing on the ex ante moral hazard problem in Mookherjee and Png (1989) . In contrast, information revelation can only be obtained with a distortion of the transfers, and therefore of the effort decision.
In a more general model, truthful revelation may not obtain. This more general model should allow for at least two important modifications: (i) richer and more flexible messages for the agent (i.e. relaxing ∆θ = θ 2 − θ 1 = θ 3 − θ 2 ) and (ii) afford the principal to choose his audit technology. However I conjecture that as long as instruments remain limited, the message of this paper essentially remains: the option to misreport ex post induces ex ante distortions.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: Suppose (3.1) and (3.3) are satisfied (either strictly or with some
is necessarily slack. To show existence, take (3.1) and (3.3) binding. Then we have v(t 3 ) >
For the last statement, take (3.2) binding. Then
Either way it follows that 1 
Proof of Lemma
which is an obvious contradiction. So (4.1) must be violated. 
. A similar argument can be constructed for the case γ 1 = 0 by using (4.4) instead.
Proof of Proposition 2:
In the standard problem (4.3)-(4.5) read
Increase v i ∀i by some arbitrarily small amount ε > 0, so that µ = 0 as well but the cost of the contract comes within ε of the optimum. Then compare each of (7.2)-(7.4) to (4.3)-(4.5), recalling that ϕ(·) is increasing convex.
Proof of Lemma 4:
Suppose these constraints fail for some contract, then the agent only ever reports θ 3 and receives ϕ(v 3 ) with probability 1. But then there is no incentive for effort.
Proof of Lemma 5:
1. The first case is not so obvious because it allows for v 1 < 0 < v 2 < v 3 . But then the agent pools at θ 3 when observing θ 1 . So Problem 2 becomes Any effort on the part of the agent requires v 3 ≥ v 2 , which immediately violates the moral hazard constraint. The principal will never offer such a contract.
2. In the second case, v 1 again is "off equilibrium" because the agent reports θ 2 if observing θ 1 and otherwise pools at θ 3 . The moral hazard constraint (7.5) rewrites ∆π 1 (v 2 −v 3 ) ≥ ψ > 0, which is a contradiction again. The principal will never offer such a contract.
3. In the last instance, v 2 is also "off equilibrium" in the sense that the agent will always pool at θ 3 instead of reporting θ 2 . Then the moral hazard constraint (7.5) becomes ∆π 1 (v 1 − v 3 ) ≥ ψ > 0, which can never be satisfied. The principal will never offer such a contract either. and subtract the agent's effort cost ψ to find the rent U N T . 
Proof of Lemma
Proof of Proposition 4:
